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Abstract 
 
What is Aristotle’s conception of thumos? This question can be broken down 
into two separate but related questions: (a) what is the object of desire for 
thumos, and (b) in which faculty of the soul is thumos grounded? The latter 
question is the focus of this paper. In this paper, “grounded in” is to be taken 
physiologically; the second question can be rephrased as “Which faculty of the soul 
is thumos a function of?” As a general rule Aristotle employs both a colloquial 
and a technical sense of thumos throughout the corpus. When I ask “What is 
thumos?,” I am interested in the technical sense that appears primarily in On 
the Soul and in the Nicomachean Ethics, where thumos is defined as a 
category of desire (a subset of orexis). The main argument of this paper is that 
Aristotle’s thumos is grounded in the faculty of phantasia – specifically, a sub-
faculty called definite phantasia. 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Introducing the Problem 
In On the Soul, Aristotle offers a tripartite division of desire 
mirroring Plato’s tripartite division of the soul: “For in the part that 
can reason there will be wishing [boulēsis], and in the irrational part 
wanting [epithumia] and passion [thumos]; so if the soul is tripartite 
there will be desire [orexis] in each.”1 Although he brings this up 
______________ 
* The author is a graduated student with a Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy 
(McGill University). 
1 Aristotle, On the Soul, trans. Eugene T. Gendlin (Spring Valley, NY: 
Focusing Institute, 2012), 432b5-7. 
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primarily to dismiss Plato’s division of the soul by showing how 
desire cannot be its own faculty, it is a technical division that he uses 
elsewhere in On the Soul and in various other texts. The three 
categories of desire he establishes are epithumia, boulēsis, and thumos. 
Aristotle defines these three categories in terms of their respective 
objects of desire. Epithumia, as explained in On the Soul 2.3, is the 
desire for pleasant things. It arises from the faculty of sense-
perception because sensation is necessarily accompanied by pleasure 
and pain, and inherent in the nature of feeling pleasure and pain is the 
desire for more pleasant things and for fewer painful things. 2 This is 
the basic kind of desire that any animal with a faculty of sense-
perception experiences.  
The object of desire for boulēsis, as defined in the Nicomachean 
Ethics 3.4, is the good: “The good is without qualification and in truth 
the object of wish [boulēton], whereas what appears good to a given 
person is the object of wish for that person.”3 The reason for which 
Aristotle references the apparent good is that he wants to explain how 
vicious people wish, since surely they can. People cannot falsely wish; 
even when vicious people wish, they wish for something that appears 
good to them (though it is not good tout court). For virtuous people, the 
object of their wish is both the apparent good relative to them and 
also the good without qualification. It seems clear, although Aristotle 
does not explain precisely how, that boulēsis arises in some way out of 
______________ 
2 Aristotle, DA 413b22-414b3. It is important to note that for Aristotle 
epithumia is not a desire for pleasure itself, but for pleasant things. This is 
because sensation for Aristotle is an interaction between the living thing in 
question and the external world, so the desire rises up in relation to some 
particular thing that could be pleasant, rather than in relation to the idea of 
pleasure in general. This is true for boulēsis and thumos as well. They are 
categories of desire; epithumia is a general category – namely, desire for 
pleasure. Certain kinds of desires, such as thirst for a cup of water or hunger 
for an apple, fall under that category. This is because all desire is 
accompanied by phantasia; we need to be able to imagine the thing we desire 
(see Section II). If what we desire is as abstract as “the good” or “pleasure” 
we aren’t able to do that. The image has to be specific.  
3 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Christopher Rowe (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 1113a23-24. 
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the rational faculty of the soul, since normative thinking is exclusive 
to those animals with rational capacities.4 
Unlike epithumia and boulēsis, it is not clear from any of Aristotle’s 
texts what the object of desire for thumos is; nor is it clear that thumos 
is tied to any particular faculty of the soul in a similar way. The focus 
of this paper will be on the latter issue. Specifically, I want to 
determine precisely where thumos fits into Aristotle’s physiological 
account of the soul in On the Soul. Because thumos seems to somehow 
involve justice when it manifests in humans,5 it is important that I be 
able to explain how both humans and non-rational animals are able 
to experience thumos while accounting for the involvement of 
normativity on the human level. 
In this paper I will contend that thumos is grounded in the faculty 
of phantasia by making two related arguments. First, the paper as a 
whole will be framed around the claim that Aristotle is for the most 
part building his conception of thumos out of the Platonic one found 
in the Republic and that the differences between the Platonic and 
Aristotelian conception are largely a result of the relegation of thumos 
from soul-part in the former to category of desire in the latter (as 
opposed to an entirely new conception). Second, I will argue that 
thumos is linked to the faculty of imagination (henceforth phantasia) as 
epithumia is to sense-perception and boulēsis is to nous (the faculty of 
thought). Specifically, I will argue that thumos is grounded in a sub-
faculty described in On the Soul, book three: definite phantasia. My 
argument will focus first on the role that self-consciousness plays in 
thumos, and then turn to an examination of the link between definite 
phantasia and memory’s role in creating self-consciousness. After 
setting out these arguments, I will consider a potential objection to my 
argument stemming from Aristotle’s conception of fear. I outline and respond to 
the objection by arguing that fear is related not to thumos but to epithumia.  
 
 
 
______________ 
4 Aristotle, Pol. 1253a7-18. Specifically, Aristotle says that it is our unique 
ability to think and conceptualize via language that grounds our capacity for 
normative judgments. 
5 See Aristotle’s discussions of anger, indignation, etc. in Rhetoric, book two. 
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1.2. Plato on Thumos 
In this section I aim to clarify how Aristotle’s conception of 
thumos relates to Plato’s in more detail than I have offered thus far. 
Before doing so, I need to explain Plato’s account on its own terms 
as it is found in the Republic. Plato first introduces the tripartite 
division of the soul in book four of the Republic. He reasons that there 
must be at least two parts of the soul, given certain internal conflicts 
that human beings face. For example, take a case in which a person is 
thirsty but nonetheless does not want to drink. It seems that one 
thing is making them thirsty – the appetitive part of the soul – and 
one is forbidding them from drinking – the rational part of the soul.6 
However, there also seems to be a third part of the soul, by which we 
feel anger: thumos. To distinguish thumos from the appetitive, Plato 
provides the example of Leontius, who has an appetite to look at 
corpses along the wayside as he travels by them.7 In the same way 
that there was a conflict for the thirsty person, there seems to be a 
conflict here as well; Leontius at once has an appetitive desire to look 
at the corpses, but also feels disgusted and angry with himself for 
having this desire. 
In addition to being different from the appetitive, thumos also 
seems to oppose it in a very important way: “in the civil war in the 
soul [thumos] aligns itself far more with the rational part.”8 In light of 
this alliance, Plato needs to distinguish thumos from the rational part 
as well. We know that thumos is not the same as the rational, says 
Plato, because children and animals have thumos without developed 
rational capabilities.9 However, if thumos and reason are not the same 
thing, then why does thumos tend to “all[y] itself with reason”?10  
To answer this question, it is helpful to consider Plato’s analysis of 
courage: “And it is because of the spirited part, I suppose, that we 
call a single individual courageous, namely, when it preserves through 
pains and pleasures the declarations of reason about what is to be 
______________ 
6 Plato, Rep. 439c-d. 
7 Plato, Rep. 439e. 
8 Plato, The Republic, translated by G. M. A. Grube (Indianapolis: Hackett, 
1974), 440e. 
9 Plato, Rep. 441a-b. 
10 Plato, The Republic, trans. G. M. A. Grube, 440b. 
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feared and what isn’t.”11 Take the example of a soldier on a battlefield 
who is fighting two enemy soldiers. Although he is outnumbered, 
rationally he has concluded that he is most likely skilled enough at 
combat to win the fight. Nonetheless, he has an appetitive desire to 
flee in the face of possible painful injury (or even death). Reason pulls 
the soldier towards choosing to fight, and appetite towards fleeing. 
The role that thumos plays in mediating this sort of conflict is siding 
with reason by pulling the soldier towards the more courageous 
action. Note that thumos’s siding with reason cannot be driven by 
considerations of pleasure and pain, since those are the motivations 
of appetite. Similarly, it cannot be driven by considerations of good 
and bad in the way that reason is. A common theory is that thumos is 
driven by considerations of kalon – the fine, noble, and honorable. 
Against the potential pain that appetite fears, the soldier finds 
fighting to be a fine, noble, and honourable action, in addition to 
holding the rational belief that he can win the fight.  
Although the above is not incorrect as a general overview of 
Platonic thumos, I believe that there is more going on in the Republic. 
My view is the same as the one argued for by John Cooper in his 
paper “Plato’s Theory of Human Motivation.”12 In that paper Cooper 
argues against the claim that Plato conceives of thumos in order to 
parallel the three classes of citizen in the state with three parts of the 
soul in the individual. Rather, he thinks that underlying the tripartite 
division of the soul is a psychological theory of motivation; each soul 
part represents different kinds of motivations that spur our decision-
making processes. This is very similar to some of Aristotle’s views. 
Aristotle does not use the terminology of motivation for decision-
making, but for him desires are essentially motivations in that they 
play an integral role in movement – for without desire as an impetus 
no creature would ever act.13 A more direct connection between 
Aristotle and Plato can be seen in Republic, book 9, when Socrates 
says the following: “[i]t seems to me that there are three pleasures 
corresponding to the three parts of the soul, one peculiar to each 
______________ 
11 Plato, The Republic, trans. G. M. A. Grube, 442b-c. 
12 J. M. Cooper, “Plato’s Theory of Human Motivation,” History of Philosophy 
Quarterly 1, no. 1 (1984): p. 3-21. 
13 Aristotle, DA 433a13-15. 
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part, and similarly with desires.”14 Like Aristotle, Plato sees appetitive 
desires as desires having to do with pain and pleasure, like hunger, 
thirst, or sexual desire.15 Additionally, for Plato the desire of reason 
is, much like Aristotle, the desire for the good.16 
As for thumos, Plato introduces it at least partially as an 
explanation for various emotions that we feel: anger of many kinds, 
shame, indignation, pride, etc.17 On the basis of several passages from 
the Republic books 4, 8, and 9, Cooper shows that Plato understands 
thumos as that by which “one feels a) the competitive drive to 
distinguish oneself from the run-of-the-mill person, to do and be 
something noteworthy within the context provided by one’s society 
and its scheme of values; b) pride in oneself and one’s 
accomplishments, to the extent that one succeeds in this effort; c) 
esteem for noteworthy others and (especially) the desire to be 
esteemed by others and by oneself.”18 His suggestion is that, on 
Plato’s view, thumotic motivations are rooted in a “desire for self-
esteem and…esteem by others.”19  
On Cooper’s account, thumos differs from the appetitive part of 
the soul because “appetites lack the self-reference which is essential 
to esteem and self-esteem.”20 For instance, the physical feeling of 
hunger in one’s stomach does not require self-reference in the way 
that an emotion like shame does. The difference between desires of 
thumos and desires of reason, on the other hand, cannot be about self-
reference since desires of reason may also be self-referential. Rather, 
the difference is in the origin of the different desires. For reason, 
desires for the good come from rational deliberation on what is good 
and what is not. Thumotic desires, on the other hand, find their 
origin in “all kinds of contingencies in one’s upbringing and 
subsequent life”; they are in a sense socially constructed.21 What 
people hold worthy of esteem often varies amongst different societies 
______________ 
14 Plato, Republic, trans. G. M. A. Grube, 580d7-9. 
15 Plato, Rep. 437d3; 439d6. 
16 Plato, Rep. 505d11-e1. 
17 Cooper, “Plato’s Theory of Human Motivation,” p. 12. 
18 Ibid., p. 14. 
19 Ibid., p. 15. 
20 Ibid., p. 16. 
21 Ibid.  
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and types of people.22 In forming a desire from reason, thinking 
about what is good comes first, and the desire is formed on account 
of those thoughts. But for thumotic desires, just as with appetites, the 
desire for esteem comes first before any considerations of the good.  
As expressed in Section I.1 of this paper, my contention here is 
that Aristotle’s thumos is nearly the same as the thumos of Cooper’s 
Plato. Recall that in On the Soul 3.9, Aristotle defends his division of 
the soul against Plato’s: 
[f]or in one way there seem to be an unlimited number [of 
soul parts] and not only those [that] some authors mention 
in distinguishing them – the parts capable of reasoning, 
passion, and wanting, or (according to others) the rational 
and irrational parts; for in virtue of the distinguishing 
characteristics by which they distinguish these parts, there 
will clearly be other parts too with a greater disparity 
between them than these, those which we have already 
discussed[:] the nutritive, which belongs both to plants and 
to all animals, and [sense-perception], which could not 
easily be set down as either irrational or rational. There is 
[also] the part capable of imagination, which is different 
from all of them in being[,] although with which of them it 
is identical or non-identical presents a great problem if we 
are to posit separate parts of the soul. In addition to these 
there is the part capable of desire, which is held to be 
different from all in definition and potentiality. And it 
would [surely] be absurd to split this up; for in the part 
that can reason there will be wishing, and in the irrational 
part wanting and passion; so if the soul is tripartite there 
will be desire in each.23 
______________ 
22 Plato makes this evident in his account of the four kinds of persons 
lacking the virtue of justice in Republic, books 8 and 9. Cooper gives a good 
overview of this, but it is not within the scope of this paper to completely 
reconstruct his argument. It is enough for me to summarize the main points 
that I agree with. 
23 Aristotle, On the Soul, trans. Eugene T. Gendlin, 432a24-b7. (Translation 
modified) 
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Although he references other divisions of the soul (irrational vs. 
rational), the theory that Aristotle is most clearly setting himself 
against is Plato’s tripartite division of the soul. Desire cannot be a 
soul-part on its own the way that Plato claims, because under his 
tripartite division there would be desire in all three parts. However, 
rather than pointing out this flaw and then discarding the division 
entirely, Aristotle keeps the tripartite division, but for desire: boulēsis 
(corresponding to the rational part of the soul), thumos (corresponding 
to the spirited part of the soul), and epithumia (corresponding to the 
appetitive part of the soul). Yet, as we have seen, if Cooper is right 
(as I think he is), then Aristotle’s criticism of Plato is off the mark. 
Plato is without a doubt aware that there is a kind of desire for each 
part of the soul.24 Although it is unclear if Aristotle is deliberately 
misrepresenting Plato’s views in order to prop up his own, what is 
clear is that Aristotle adopts the tripartite division for desire. We 
know this because he explicitly describes epithumia, boulēsis, and thumos 
as the three sub-categories of orexis elsewhere in On the Soul as well as 
in the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics.25 
Given (a) that Aristotle explicitly adopts Plato’s tripartite division 
for desire, (b) that Aristotle and Plato both use thumos to account for 
the same phenomena (emotions such as anger, normative feelings like 
shame and indignation, pride, the human concern with public 
reputation and honor, etc.), and (c) that Plato’s account of appetitive 
desires (for pleasure) and desires of reason (for the good) parallel 
Aristotle’s epithumia and boulēsis, it seems quite plausible that Plato 
heavily influenced Aristotle’s theory of desire. And if Aristotle is 
operating under a generally Platonic understanding of the different 
kinds of desires, then his account of thumos – the subject of our 
investigation – would likely parallel the one outlined in the Republic.  
However, it is important to note that, although the accounts of 
the three kinds of desire may parallel one another, they are not 
identical. The difference between the two accounts lies in Aristotle’s 
vastly different account of the soul. Unlike Plato’s, Aristotle’s account 
of the soul is a physiological one in which he defines a soul as a set of 
______________ 
24 Plato, Rep. 580d7-9. 
25 Aristotle, EN 1111b10-13 and EE 1225b24-25. 
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capacities.26 When organisms engage in activities like nutrition, 
movement, or thought, they do so in virtue of the system of 
capacities that they have; they do so in virtue of their soul. This is 
relevant to the topic at hand because Aristotle grounds desires 
physiologically in his account of the soul: epithumia is grounded in the 
faculty of sense-perception and boulēsis is grounded in the faculty of 
thought. Although Aristotle does not explicitly do so himself, it 
follows that thumos can similarly be grounded somewhere in his 
account of the soul. This clearly contradicts Plato’s account of these 
three kinds of desire. For Plato, only appetitive desires have a 
physiological explanation of this kind.27 
One of the reasons for which Aristotle considers his account to 
be superior is that it is more nuanced and can easily explain the 
differences among different kinds of living organisms: plants have 
only the nutritive faculty; animals have the nutritive and sense-
perception; humans have both of those, in addition to nous, and so 
on. Because of this nuance and the fact that thumos is not itself a 
faculty, Aristotle can more easily explain something that both he and 
Plato believed: non-rational animals also have thumos. For Plato, 
explaining this is a serious problem. Under the Platonic view outlined 
above, thumotic desire is for self-esteem and esteem from others. 
Esteem, however, seems to be something only humans are capable of 
giving, as it seems to involve, at least on some level, normative 
considerations that animals cannot have. This is easily seen in 
emotions such as shame or indignation. It would seem bizarre to say 
that a squirrel, for example, desires esteem from other squirrels in the 
way that a person does from their community. If Plato sees the 
animal soul as consisting only of appetite and thumos, then how can he 
explain this normativity? He must either abandon his assertion that 
animals have thumos, or he must provide a different account of 
thumotic desire.  
______________ 
26 He defines the soul as “the first actuality of a natural body that has life 
potentially” (DA 412a27). Since a first actuality is acquiring a set of 
capacities, and the soul is a first actuality, then the soul is defined as a set of 
capacities. 
27 Plato, Rep. 439d1-2. See also Cooper, “Plato’s Theory of Human 
Motivation,” p. 10-12. 
Vivian Feldblyum 
 10 
In contrast, it is easy for Aristotle to explain how both animals 
and humans have thumos – namely, by grounding thumos in one of the 
lower-level faculties that humans and animals share. What allows 
Aristotle to do this is his relegation of thumos from soul-part to 
category of desire. In the following section I will consider Aristotle’s 
views of thumos independently of Plato, as found in his works on 
natural philosophy, and consider what lower-level faculty thumos 
could be grounded in. I will then show that thumos is grounded in the 
faculty of phantasia.  
2. Thumos and Phantasia 
2.1. The Faculty of Phantasia 
As I stated in Section I.1, my primary aim in this paper is to show 
that Aristotle’s thumos is grounded in the faculty of phantasia. In this 
section I will explain why I think that phantasia is the likely faculty in 
which thumos is grounded, and I will go over the general role phantasia 
plays in Aristotle’s account of the soul. My reasoning primarily comes 
from the hierarchical nature of Aristotle’s account of the soul. On his 
account, the lower level faculties of the soul are necessary conditions 
for higher faculties. For example, it is impossible for an animal to 
have the faculty of nous but not the faculty of sense-perception, or to 
have sense-perception but not the nutritive faculty.28 In On the Soul 
Aristotle outlines four different faculties: the nutritive faculty, sense-
perception, phantasia, and nous.29 Thumos cannot be grounded in the 
nutritive faculty because, if it were, plants would have the capacity for 
it, which they plainly do not. On the opposite end, thumos cannot be 
grounded in nous because thumos is not exclusive to humans.  
______________ 
28 Aristotle, DA 432a27-31. 
29 There is debate as to whether or not locomotion is its own faculty for 
Aristotle. It might be, since Aristotle seems to go out of his way to 
distinguish it from nous and perception just like he does for phantasia. It is 
beyond the scope of this paper to go into whether or not locomotion is its 
own faculty, because it seems very unlikely that thumos would be grounded in 
it if it were; there is nothing unique to locomotion that might ground thumos, 
unlike phantasia, which includes the capacity for memory. 
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Similarly, thumos cannot be grounded in the faculty of sense-
perception. In Sense and Sensibilia, Aristotle remarks that the purpose 
of the work is to consider in further detail those activities and 
characteristics of animals grounded in both the soul and the body, 
particularly “sensation, memory, thumos, appetite and desire in 
general, and, in addition, pleasure and pain. These are found 
practically in all animals.”30 Note that Aristotle does not say that 
thumos is found in all animals, but that it is found in practically all 
animals. In other words, there are some animals that do not 
experience thumos. Aristotle is most likely thinking of an animal like a 
sea sponge, which clearly does not exhibit thumotic behaviours; after 
all, sea sponges do not feel anger, jealousy, shame, etc. Since all 
animals possess a faculty of sense-perception, it cannot be the case 
that thumos is grounded in sense-perception or it would be found in 
all animals.  
This leaves us with the faculty of phantasia. Independently of the 
above process of elimination, there is reason to suspect that Aristotle 
would ground thumos in phantasia. For one, it is heavily involved in his 
account of emotions in Rhetoric, book two.31 Furthermore, Aristotle, 
like Plato, treats thumos as though it is somewhere in the middle 
between reason and the appetites.32 In Aristotle’s account of the soul, 
phantasia is the faculty that links sense-perception (which grounds 
epithumia) and nous (which grounds boulēsis). It stands to reason that 
thumos might be grounded in the faculty between these two.  
In On the Soul 3.3, Aristotle defines phantasia as “a motion taking 
place as a result of sense-perception in act.”33 It is a motion that does 
not “occur apart from sense-perception, but only in what perceives 
and of that of which there is perception.”34 The connection between 
______________ 
30 Aristotle, Sense and Sensibilia, trans. J. I. Beare (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
UP, 1984), 436a9. (Translation modified) 
31 For example, he defines anger as the desire for retaliation, and the mental 
state associated with such a desire is one in which imagining this retaliation 
is pleasurable (Rhet. 1378a30-33). Fear, another emotion he discusses there, 
is a state of mental anguish at imagining some nearby possible pain or evil 
(Rhet. 1382a22-23). See Rhetoric, book two for more.  
32 Aristotle, EN 1149a24-b8. 
33 Aristotle, On the Soul, trans. Eugene T. Gendlin, 428b30-31. 
34 Ibid., 428b10-14.  
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phantasia and sense-perception is clear; having the faculty of sense-
perception is a necessary condition for phantasia, because images 
(phantasmata) can only be of things that can be and have been 
perceived. Phantasia, in that way, is a motion that continues from 
sense-perception because it uses past perceptions (recalls images 
through memory).  
At this juncture it is reasonable to point out that phantasia, as 
described above, runs into the same problem I attributed to sense-
perception – namely, that all animals possess this faculty.35 Aristotle is 
explicit about this, noting that sense-perception is both a necessary 
and sufficient condition for phantasia: “if sensation, then phantasia.”36 
This is an obvious consequence of his conception of phantasia as a 
continuation of the motion of sense-perception, and as something 
that “does not occur apart from sense-perception.”37 At first glance 
this appears to be a serious objection. As is often the case with 
Aristotle, however, the devil is in the details. In On the Soul, book 
three, Aristotle distinguishes between three types of phantasia that 
animals may possess: deliberative, indefinite, and definite. It is this 
distinction that paves the way for grounding thumos in the faculty of 
phantasia. In the following two sections I will outline these 
distinctions in detail and then contend that thumos is grounded in 
definite phantasia specifically. 
 
 
______________ 
35 On Aristotle’s definition, all animals do possess phantasia. However, he 
makes what at first appears to be a perplexing comment: that ants, bees, and 
grubs do not have phantasia (DA 428a8). I opted not to include this in the 
main body of my paper because the comment is understandable in light of 
his later distinction between three different kinds of phantasia. See section 
II.3 and footnote 21 for more. 
36 Aristotle, DA 413b23 (my own translation). 
37 Aristotle, DA 428b10-14. Because phantasia does not occur apart from 
sense-perception, some might argue that phantasia is not actually its own 
faculty. I disagree; in On the Soul, book three, Aristotle pointedly goes out of 
his way to distinguish phantasia from sense-perception and thought. For the 
purposes of this paper, however, I am omitting a full exegesis of book three 
of DA, and take the designation of phantasia as a faculty of the soul as given 
for Aristotle. 
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2.2. Three Kinds of Phantasia: Deliberative, Indefinite, and Definite 
Towards the end of On the Soul 3.10, Aristotle makes a distinction 
between two types of phantasia: deliberative and perceptual.38 He goes 
on to say that deliberative phantasia is the ability to “make a unity out 
of several images.”39 What does this mean, and why does Aristotle 
say it?  
Aristotle says that “deliberative phantasia [is found] only in those 
that are deliberative: for whether this or that shall be enacted is 
already a task requiring deliberation (logos); and there must be a single 
standard to measure by, for that is pursued which is greater.”40 Only 
those animals that can reason (namely, humans) have deliberative 
phantasia. To make a decision, a choice between two avenues of 
action for a single end, a being must be able to deliberate. In order to 
reason to a choice, this kind of being must have a standard by which 
to judge one avenue superior. So “making a unity out of several 
images” literally means being able to compare. It is taking two or 
more images (imagining different ways that one might go about 
achieving some X), and making them one; comparing them side by 
side to determine which is better based on some standard. 
Deliberative phantasia is the ability to compare alternative choices for 
action. Perceptual phantasia, on the other hand, is something all 
animals have; it does not involve deliberation of this kind. 
At the beginning of On the Soul 3.11, Aristotle makes a subdivision 
within perceptual phantasia between indefinite phantasia and definite 
phantasia. He says only the following about this division:  
[w]e must consider also in the case of imperfect animals, 
those which have no sense but touch, what it is that in 
______________ 
38 Aristotle, DA 433b29-30. An alternative translation is “calculative” 
phantasia. Generally, words with logos as their root are translated as a 
declension of either “deliberation” or “calculation.” For the sake of 
consistency in this paper, I will use “deliberation” and “deliberative” 
exclusively, even when the particular translation I am quoting from uses 
“calculative.”  
39 Aristotle, On the Soul, trans. J. A. Smith (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 
1984), 434a10. 
40 Ibid., DA 434a7-100. 
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them originates movement. Can they have phantasia or not? 
Or desire [epithumia]? Clearly they have feelings of pleasure 
and pain, and if they have these they must also have desire 
[epithumia]. But how can they have phantasia? Must not we 
say that, as their movements are indefinite, they have 
phantasia and desire [epithumia], but indefinitely?41  
The context here is fairly important. Aristotle comes up with 
“indefinite phantasia” as a way to deal with animals that have 
perception (touch) but do not locomote. He initially used the 
example of such animals to show that locomotion was different from 
perception, since there were animals with sense perception that did 
not locomote. However, here he has to deal with the consequences of 
considering such creatures by explaining how they can have phantasia 
and desire, which are necessarily entailed by perception.42 
Remember that, for Aristotle, when a sensation is painful (or 
pleasant), the pain (or pleasure) is not a second event, not another 
activity in addition to sensing.43 Rather, it is the sensation itself that 
has this quality, and the quality itself necessarily involves the 
possibility and desire for less of it. (This is why he says that epithumia 
comes necessarily out of perception.) A good example is the feeling 
of hunger in one’s stomach; inherent in the feeling itself is the desire 
to lessen the discomfort. The desire and the sensation are concurrent. 
This phenomenon of being guided to move by the possibility of 
less or more of a sensation, which animals with only touch also 
experience, is itself a kind of phantasia that comes necessarily along 
with pleasure and pain. This is what Aristotle terms indefinite 
phantasia. It does not involve having a picture (phantasma) of the 
preferred condition, because it happens in the present time and not in 
the future drawing upon past memories. 
Why call this indefinite phantasia? In the quote above he is 
comparing this kind of phantasia to indefinite motion. The Greek 
word being worked with here is the adverb aoristōs, which derives 
______________ 
41 Aristotle, On the Soul, trans. J. A. Smith, 433b31-434a6. 
42 At this point in On the Soul we already know that sensation necessarily 
includes phantasia and desire because it has been stated several times, for 
example in 2.2: “if sensation, then phantasia and desire” (DA 413b23). 
43 See Aristotle’s description of epithumia in On the Soul 2.3. 
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from the verb horizō, meaning “to mark out by boundaries” or “to 
define.”44 For Aristotle, motion is defined by its limits – where it 
begins and where it stops. The animals in question don’t locomote, 
so there aren’t clear boundaries to their kind of rudimentary 
movement. Hence their movement is classified as indefinite or 
indeterminate. In the same way that their motion lacks spatial 
definition, the phantasia of these animals lacks temporal definition 
because it exists in the present moment, occurring simultaneously as 
the creature perceives. 
What we would call definite phantasia, then, is when phantasia 
involves drawing upon memories, which can provide clearer 
boundaries: memories are of the past, we are imagining something in 
the present, and the thing being imagined might be placed in the 
future. Other kinds of animals, such as dogs or cats, have this sort of 
phantasia.45 It is important to note that although the capacities for 
phantasia and desire are both necessary consequences of having a 
faculty of sense-perception, it is phantasia that plays a mediating role 
between sensation and desire. We know that it plays a mediating role 
because you can imagine things without desiring them, but you 
cannot desire things without imagining them. For example, I can 
imagine a pink elephant in the room, but this does not cause any sort 
of desire for pink elephants to be in the room. Desire necessarily 
entails phantasia, but phantasia does not necessarily entail desire. In 
fact, Aristotle states this quite explicitly: “[an animal] is not capable of 
desire without possessing phantasia.”46 
______________ 
44 An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon founded upon the Seventh 
Edition of Liddell and Scott’s Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1991), s.v. “horizō.” 
45 This distinction makes sense of Aristotle’s seemingly strange comment 
about grubs and ants in On the Soul III.3 (see Footnote 15). They don’t have 
the kind of perceptual phantasia that Aristotle was discussing there, that 
requires drawing upon memories, but they certainly do have this kind of 
basic phantasia that necessarily comes along with the ability to sense. They 
lack definite phantasia, but still have the indefinite variety. In this way, 
Aristotle can still say that all creatures who have the faculty of sense-
perception also have phantasia, but he can also explain why there seems to be 
a difference between certain kinds of creatures given capacity for memory, 
etc. 
46 Aristotle, DA 433b27-30 (my own translation). 
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2.3. Grounding Thumos in Definite Phantasia 
Having now thoroughly explained Aristotle’s conception of 
phantasia, I will argue that thumos is grounded in the faculty of phantasia 
just as epithumia is in sense-perception and boulēsis in nous. Specifically, 
I will ground thumos in definite phantasia. My argument rests on the 
two following claims: (a) self-consciousness is a necessary condition 
for thumos, and (b) definite phantasia is a necessary condition for self-
consciousness. When I use the term “self-consciousness” I mean it in 
the modern, philosophical sense of the term, as opposed to the 
colloquial sense of feeling ashamed or embarrassed.47 I mean it as an 
awareness that one is aware; an awareness of oneself as a self.48  
The reason that an animal must be self-conscious in order to 
experience thumos is one that has already been discussed with regard 
to Plato: thumotic desires are self-referential.49 A person cannot refer 
to a self without an awareness of that self. This seems to hold true for 
Aristotle’s thumos as well. For example, consider the distinction 
Aristotle makes between slaves and citizens in Politics 7.7. There, he 
states that the people of Asian countries are enslaved because they 
lack thumos.50 What is the connection between lacking thumos and 
slavery? Recall that for Aristotle a slave is a person who is not fit to 
rule himself: a person who is naturally lacking in deliberative capacity. 
Additionally, a person is a citizen when they are precisely the 
opposite of that: the willingness to deliberate and judge – that is, to 
be a citizen – requires a sense of self-importance that the slave lacks.51 This 
sense of self-importance, which underlies thumos, is a demand that 
others view your judgments and deliberations as important as well; 
that is, a demand that people recognize and respect you and your 
opinions. Aside from this particular example, it seems generally true 
______________ 
47 It is the post-Cartesian sense of self-consciousness. 
48 Awareness that we are aware entails awareness of a “we” that is aware. It 
is quite literally self-awareness. 
49 See Section I.2 above. 
50 Aristotle, Pol. 1327b27. 
51 Ibid., 1275b18. 
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that the phenomena that thumos explains require a sense of self in this 
way.52  
Definite phantasia is a necessary condition for self-consciousness 
because self-consciousness requires the capacity to perceive time, 
which not all animals possess.53 This is because “self” is an identity 
that persists through time; perception of an atemporal self doesn’t 
make sense because the concept of a self is inherently temporal. Not 
only does self-consciousness require the ability to perceive time, but 
it also requires memory. This is clear; to be conscious of oneself as a 
self that persists through time requires remembering a past self. In On 
Memory, Aristotle says that memory is a function of the same part of 
the soul as imagination: phantasia.54 Since memory is a function of 
phantasia, self-consciousness is impossible without memory, and 
thumos is impossible without self-consciousness, it is clear that thumos 
must be grounded in the faculty of phantasia. However, memory 
cannot be a function of indefinite phantasia, which involves only the 
present and not the past, so thumos cannot stem from it.55 Nor can 
thumos stem from deliberative phantasia, for, if that were true, only 
humans would experience thumos. Definite phantasia, being the type of 
phantasia dealing with memories, must be the ground for both self-
consciousness and thumos.56 Even on a surface level this makes sense: 
a sea sponge does not exhibit thumotic behavior in the way that a 
human or a bull might. The relevant difference between a sea sponge 
and a bull in this case is that the sea sponge only has indefinite 
______________ 
52 There are many examples that I could list here. An illustrative one is 
anger, which occurs when a person feels insulted by another. In order to feel 
insulted, there must be some notion of a self that has been insulted; anger 
makes no sense as an emotion otherwise. This follows for the other 
emotions as well. See Rhetoric, book two. 
53 Aristotle, Mem. 449b28-29. 
54 Aristotle, Mem. 450a20-24. The perception of time comes out of the 
faculty of sense perception (Mem. 450a12-14), but the ability to retain and 
recall memories is a function of phantasia. It is this ability, not merely the 
capacity to perceive time, that is necessary for self-consciousness (and thus, 
for thumos). 
55 See Section II.2. 
56 While memory is the domain of definite phantasia (and sometimes, in 
humans, deliberative phantasia), recollection is exclusively the domain of 
deliberative phantasia. See On Memory, book two. 
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phantasia, and thus lacks the bull’s capability for self-awareness and 
thumos. 
2.4. Fear, Thumos, and Definite Phantasia 
One potential objection to my argument that thumos is grounded 
in definite phantasia stems from a counterexample involving fear. I 
have maintained throughout this paper that thumos is supposed to be 
the explanation for many of the emotions that we can experience. 
Fear is an emotion that, on its face, should fall under this category; 
not only is it one of the emotions considered in Rhetoric, book two, 
but Aristotle also explicitly describes fear in Topics as being in the 
thumoeides.57 A problem arises because there seem to be cases in which 
fear is not self-referential in the way that I argued a thumotic emotion 
must be. A good example of this is being scared by a sudden loud 
noise; the fear seems to be an instantaneous, instinctual response that 
happens in the present moment without the use of memory at all, 
much less self-reference. If fear is thumotic but may not involve self-
reference, then it seems that thumos is not necessarily self-referential. 
This undermines my entire argument for why thumos is grounded in 
definite phantasia specifically. Nonetheless there is a way for me to 
make sense of this and save my argument. Based on evidence from 
Rhetoric, On the Soul, and the Nicomachean Ethics, I will show that for 
Aristotle fear is actually not, as it seems at first, thumotic. Rather, it is 
epithumotic. 
Before dealing with this objection, I want to briefly explain 
Aristotle’s views on fear in book two of Rhetoric. He defines fear as “a 
sort of pain and agitation derived from the imagining of a future 
destructive or painful evil.”58 We don’t fear all evils, just those with 
“potential for great pains or destruction”, and even those only if the 
possible pains are near in any way. People do not only feel fear at 
things with “great potential for destruction…[and] pain,” but also at 
signs of those things. This is what it means to fear danger, which 
Aristotle defines as “an approach of something that causes fear.”59 
______________ 
57 Aristotle, Top. 126a8-9. 
58 Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse, trans. George A. Kennedy 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 1382a22-23. 
59 Ibid., 1382a31-32. 
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For example, we fear anger against us from those with the power and 
means to act because as soon as the desire for retaliation is there, 
those people will bring us pain, since the means to do so are available 
to them. In other words, we fear not only angry people in the 
moment of their anger, but we also fear actively angering them (and 
so try to avoid insulting them, etc.). Note that recognizing signs of 
danger requires the capacity for definite phantasia because it involves 
memory. Recognizing a hot stovetop as dangerous if touched, for 
example, might draw on painful memories of burning one’s hand as a 
child.  
Having outlined Aristotle’s conception of fear in Rhetoric, book 
two, I can now explain why Aristotle’s fear is not thumotic. Recall 
that in Topics Aristotle describes fear as being in the faculty of thumos 
(thumoeides).60 This is the only major piece of evidence in the 
Aristotelian corpus that favours reading Aristotle’s fear as thumotic. 
That Aristotle talks about a faculty of thumos should bring immediate 
suspicion, since we know that he does not view thumos as its own 
faculty. Furthermore, he seems to contradict the Topics in the 
Nicomachean Ethics when he discusses courage. There, he describes 
thumos as a sort of a natural courage through which animals can 
ignore and overcome fear.61 If thumos is something by which fear is 
overcome, then fear cannot be born of thumos. Indeed, evidence points 
in precisely this direction.  
Given what Aristotle wrote in both Rhetoric and On the Soul, it 
cannot be the case that fear is a manifestation of thumos. Rather, it is 
part of epithumia. Recall that for Aristotle desire in general (orexis) 
requires phantasia, which means that phantasia is involved for both 
epithumia and thumos.62 We know that epithumia is the desire for 
pleasant things, on the one hand, and, on the other, the desire to avoid 
painful things. The literal experience of this second articulation of 
epithumia is the emotion we call fear; it is experienced as mental 
anguish brought upon by imagining some nearby possible pain. Take 
the case of a rabbit that sees a wolf, becomes afraid, and runs away. 
The rabbit does not do this in virtue of any kind of thumotic desire; it 
is acting upon a desire to avoid the imagined, future, nearby pain of 
______________ 
60 Aristotle, Top. 126a8-9. 
61 Aristotle, EN 1116b35-37. 
62 Aristotle, DA 413b23. 
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being attacked. We know this because that is how Aristotle defines 
fear in Rhetoric, book two. Put another way, “fear” is the word we use 
to describe the actualized experience of the epithumotic desire to 
avoid pain. Given the above, we can take Topics 128a8-9 as an 
instance of Aristotle speaking casually rather than technically about 
the topic, as he often does. This is especially probable given that in 
this particular discussion in the Topics he is merely using these ideas as 
place-holders for a larger point about argumentation rather than 
trying to argue himself that fear is located in some sort of faculty of 
thumos. 
It is important to note that fear is epithumotic in nature, but 
animals with higher-level functions of phantasia can experience fear in 
some different ways. In the above case of the rabbit and the wolf, the 
rabbit’s desire to avoid pain makes use of definite phantasia because it 
recognizes the wolf as a sign of danger. Fear also has a basic form 
with indefinite phantasia, which can be seen when we are scared by a 
loud noise (as discussed in the beginning of this section). The reason 
this example initially appeared to pose a problem was because this 
fear happens in an instant, which is characteristic of desires arising 
through indefinite phantasia, since they deal exclusively with the 
present.63 
3. The Significance of Thumos and Avenues for Further Inquiry 
At the outset of this paper I presented two related questions: (a) 
what is the object of desire for thumos, and (b) which faculty of the 
soul is thumos grounded in? My answer to (b) here is important not 
only because it might inform an answer to (a), but also because the 
role of thumos in Aristotle’s account of desire is unduly neglected and 
under-theorized in Aristotelian scholarship.  
The only thorough attempt in the secondary literature to answer 
these questions is made by Giles Pearson in his book Aristotle on 
Desire.64 Pearson argues that thumos and orgē (anger) are synonymous: 
thumos is the desire for retaliation as defined in Rhetoric, book two. His 
______________ 
63 Aristotle also discusses some human-specific types of fear in Rhetoric, book 
two, which require deliberative phantasia. See Rhet. 1383a5-8. 
64 Giles Pearson, Aristotle on Desire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012). 
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argument relies mostly on an exposition of Aristotle’s account of 
anger in Rhetoric and providing a list of examples in which Aristotle 
uses thumos and orgē interchangeably.65 He claims that when 
discussing thumos Aristotle “almost always has in mind his account 
of orgê, a desire for revenge owing to a perceived slight.”66 However, 
this is patently untrue. For example, in History of Animals 9.1 Aristotle 
associates thumos with shame and envy, and in Politics 7.7 he grounds 
philia in thumos.67 Pearson dismisses such examples by calling them 
isolated events in Aristotle’s work.  
The main problem with Pearson’s interpretation is that he 
flippantly dismisses certain passages in Aristotle’s writings when his 
own interpretation can be dismissed for far better reasons. Pearson’s 
argument hinges on the fact that Aristotle frequently uses thumos and 
orgē interchangeably. What Pearson seems to miss is the distinction 
between Aristotle’s colloquial and technical usage of thumos. In those 
passages where thumos and orgē are synonymous, Aristotle is not using 
thumos in the technical sense that Pearson is after. A point made by 
John Cooper in his article on Plato is useful to us here: “by Plato’s 
time [thumos] seems to have been in ordinary use mostly as a name for 
anger: the word is in fact etymologically the same as our word 
‘fume’ – someone in a state of thumos would be ‘fuming’ about 
something. But in Homer… the word has a broader usage” as the 
“seat of emotion.”68 It is this usage that Plato employs in the Republic 
and that Aristotle borrows in his categorization of thumos as a type of 
desire in On the Soul. The passages in which Aristotle conflates thumos 
and orgē are using the colloquial, ordinary meaning of thumos. Since 
these are the passages that form the crux of Pearson’s argument, in 
the end his interpretation lacks sufficient textual support. 
John Cooper gives the only other significant interpretation in his 
book Reason and Emotion, where he argues that the kalon is the object 
of desire for Aristotle’s thumos. The core of this argument is based on 
Aristotle’s assertion in the Nicomachean Ethics that there are three 
objects of choice: “the kalon (the noble, fine, beautiful), the 
______________ 
65 Giles Pearson, Aristotle on Desire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012), p. 111-117 (“Reason and Desire”). 
66 Ibid., p. 132 
67 Aristotle, HA 608b7-13 and Pol. 1327b39. 
68 Cooper, “Plato’s Theory of Human Motivation,” p. 12. 
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advantageous, and the pleasant.”69 Cooper connects each object of 
choice to one of Aristotle’s categories of desire: the pleasant to 
epithumia, the advantageous to boulēsis, and the kalon to thumos.70 The 
assertion that the kalon is thumos’s object of desire should immediately 
ring false to someone who knows that Aristotelian thumos is found in 
both humans and animals. There is no way that an animal could 
desire the kalon because it is a normative concept. In order to desire 
it, the being in question would need to have logos, which animals 
plainly do not. Cooper himself acknowledges this, and quickly 
elaborates that he does not think that the kalon is the object of thumos 
in general. Rather, it is the object of desire “for the morally virtuous 
person, and only after a certain stage is reached in the special course 
of moral development and self-discipline that leads a person to the 
possession of the virtues of character.”71  
That the only two meaningful attempts to settle the question of 
thumos fall short of the providing the right answer reinforces that my 
paper is a significant contribution to the ongoing conversation, 
because it is a stepping stone to answering the question definitively. 
Moreover, both Pearson and Cooper fail to address even in passing 
what I have shown here to be a central question regarding 
Aristotelian thumos – namely, its place in Aristotle’s account of the 
soul. To the best of my knowledge, my paper alone considers thumos 
from a physiological angle and attempts to make sense of it in the 
context of On the Soul.  
In addition, the arguments that I have made regarding thumos 
provide multiple avenues for further inquiry. First of all, what I have 
said here provides a good basis for a follow-up paper on what the 
object of desire for thumos is. Second of all, understanding thumos 
helps us rethink Aristotle’s psychology; understanding thumos and the 
tripartite division of desire on the whole is a great aid in 
understanding Aristotle’s accounts of various other topics like 
______________ 
69 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. W.D. Ross (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
UP, 1984), 1104b30-1105a1. 
70 Cooper argues that “the advantageous” in this passage is a stand-in for 
“the good,” which he connects to boulēsis. John Cooper, Reason and 
Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 265-266. 
71 Ibid,. p. 276. 
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locomotion, choice, and virtue. In Section I.2 of this paper I also 
argued that we need to consider Plato’s account of desire as an 
influence on Aristotle’s account (and therefore his philosophy of 
action as well as psychology in general). Third of all, although I did 
not discuss it here, understanding thumos would prove very useful to 
someone interested in Aristotelian notions of manliness, since thumos 
was no doubt a gendered concept. Finally, the recognition that fear is 
epithumatic is useful for future work on Aristotelian notions of 
courage and cowardice, especially from a physiological angle. 
Bibliography 
Aristotle. The Complete Works of Aristotle. Edited by Jonathan Barnes. 2 
vols. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1984. 
Aristotle. On the Soul. Translated by J.A. Smith. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton UP, 1984. 
Aristotle. Sense and Sensibilia. Translated by J.I. Beare. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton UP, 1984. 
Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by W.D. Ross. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton UP, 1984. 
Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by C. J. Rowe. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002. 
Aristotle. On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse. Translated by 
G. Kennedy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. 
Aristotle. Line by Line Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima. Translated 
by Eugene T. Gendlin. Spring Valley, NY: Focusing Institute, 
2012. 
Cooper, John M. (1984), ‘‘Plato’s Theory of Human Motivation’’, in 
History of Philosophy Quarterly, vol. 1, n° 1, pp. 3-21. 
Cooper, J. M. Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral 
Psychology and Ethical Theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, P .1999. 
Pearson, G. Aristotle on Desire. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012.  
Plato. The Republic. Translated by G.M.A. Grube. Complete Works. 
Edited by John M. Cooper and D.S. Hutchinson. Indianapolis, 
IN: Hackett Publishing, 1997. 
 
